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CONCEPTUAL REVIEW ARTICLE
Neurolinguistic Relativity: How Language
Flexes Human Perception and Cognition
Guillaume Thierry
School of Psychology and Centre for Research on Bilingualism, Bangor University
The time has come, perhaps, to go beyond merely acknowledging that language is a
core manifestation of the workings of the human mind and that it relates interactively
to all aspects of thinking. The issue, thus, is not to decide whether language and human
thought may be ineluctably linked (they just are), but rather to determine what the char-
acteristics of this relationship may be and to understand how language influences—and
may be influenced by—nonverbal information processing. In an attempt to demystify
linguistic relativity, I review neurolinguistic studies from our research group showing
a link between linguistic distinctions and perceptual or conceptual processing. On the
basis of empirical evidence showing effects of terminology on perception, language-
idiosyncratic relationships in semantic memory, grammatical skewing of event con-
ceptualization, and unconscious modulation of executive functioning by verbal input, I
advocate a neurofunctional approach through which we can systematically explore how
languages shape human thought.
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Think of a frog. Even better, perhaps, don’t. Here, language—in this case, a
noun supported by a verb—will have prompted a thought in your mind. Does
language have a strong relationship to thought? The second instruction above
(don’t think of a frog) is perhaps an even better illustration of the link: Not only
does language appear inherently and implacably connected to thought, but the
connection seems to escape our control entirely. It is impossible for one not
to think of something called up by language. Thus, language triggers thought,
and it does so whether we like it or not, provided we are familiar with the
code. Language is undoubtedly one of the most exquisitely sophisticated and
powerful products of the human mind. Its importance in the development of
human civilization, society, and science hardly needs introducing or highlight-
ing. Even though the language-thought binding contingency appears intuitive
to many, some scholars and thinkers have dismissed the premises of linguis-
tic relativity—an equally intuitive correlate of the contingency—as linguistic
idealism (see Jackson, 1991).
Casasanto (2008) reminds us that language is naturally not the same as
thought, because thought preexists language, both ontologically and phyloge-
netically. Animals manifest forms of cognitive processing (e.g., perception,
attention, memory, problem solving, planning, adaptive execution) that resem-
ble thought processes seen in humans (e.g., Gallistel, 1989). Preverbal infants
anticipate, direct their attention, draw inferences, and thus manifest thought
outside language (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004; Gordon, 2004). But
after having agreed that we must leave the idea of a language-thought equiva-
lence behind, we are not yet out of the woods. We can still come across the “big
bad Whorf” (Casasanto, 2008). One thing is to recognize that thought exists
outside language and thus that it likely coexists with language. Another is to
wander at the other end of a conceptual continuum and consider that thought
might be entirely independent of language. Does Pinker (2007) use a strawman
strategy to counter and ridicule the linguistic relativity hypothesis? If language
does not equate thought, must we readily adopt the extreme opposite view
and consider language-thought independence as a de facto alternative? That
is wrong, though, all wrong. Thinking that language may be entirely discon-
nected from thought is an example of what deserves to be called reductio ad
absurdum.
People who speak different languages appear to conceive of the world
somewhat differently and diversity of thought, perspective, and innovation seem
intuitively linked to naturally occurring language diversity. Why is it, then, that
many scholars in science, linguistics, and philosophy (perhaps in these fields
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more than elsewhere) are skeptical, if not overtly critical, of the idea that
languages may go hand in hand with different ways of not only conceiving and
paying attention to the world, but also literally holding different perceptions?
Perhaps the most basic argument against a strong language-thought binding
contingency concerns the commonly advocated existence of universal concepts.
If such concepts exist, then thought must be separable from language. But then,
reciprocally, if language is narrowly married to thought, and if together they are
somewhat idiosyncratic to each and every human mind, how do we know that
universal concepts are indeed universal? For instance, Jackson (1991) asks,
“Can the French not tell the difference between sheep and mutton, because
they only have one word for them?” (p. 209). Indeed, even though native
speakers of French use the label mouton for both the meat derived from the
sheep and the animal itself, they can conceptualize this distinction. If the meat–
animal distinction is shared by native speakers of both French and English,
then language arguably fails to shift the concept. However, because French and
English differ in the way they refer to the meat and the animal it derives from,
one can reasonably hypothesize that this distinction is, in fact, conceptually
different for the speakers of the two languages (e.g., a sheep may be considered
more primarily as a source of food by French speakers than English speakers).
We thus find ourselves prisoners of a circular reasoning loop: Language and
thought seem bound up with one another, but then there appear to be shared
concepts that transcend language diversity. We cannot, however, be sure that
these concepts are shared if we cannot conceptualize something independently
of a particular language or languages, and so on.
Such circular reasoning has profoundly hindered progress in characterizing
the nature of the language-thought binding contingency and partly explains the
stark skepticism that has stigmatized linguistic relativity. Breaking out of the
loop thus requires a demonstration that language and thought are intertwined
even when one ventures into territories of human cognition that are as far
from language as we can conceive. One such territory is perception. Indeed,
empirical research testing the linguistic relativity hypothesis has progressively
drifted toward the testing of nonverbal perception, in the hopes of identifying
processing differences that do not trivially derive or relate to (consciously
accessible) language distinctions, but that can rationally and indirectly be linked
to the same. However, such empirical studies (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000, 2001;
Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002; Lupyan, 2008; Lupyan & Spivey, 2010;
Meteyard, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2007) have failed to convince the skeptics
(e.g., Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005; Klemfuss, Prinzmetal, & Ivry, 2012;
Pinker, 2007), perhaps because (a) they hardly ever avoid language reference
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entirely, (b) they fail to test perception, or (c) because of a combination of (a)
and (b).
Studies relying on behavioral measures (such as reaction times and response
patterns) are notoriously susceptible to verbal interference and late, postpercep-
tual strategic effects, which may explain why reports of such effects are often
followed by publications of counterevidence or null effects studying the same
contrasts (e.g., Firestone & Scholl, 2014; January & Kako, 2007). Humans
can (and do) silently verbalize all the time and thus responses from conscious
decisions in supposedly nonverbal perceptual tasks can never be deemed free
of verbal contamination. Rather than having differently structured minds, then,
speakers of different languages may have their behavior nudged by grammar
or terminology in ways that reflect properties of their native language (Pinker,
1997). This pertinent criticism applies to most empirical studies that attempt to
draw conclusions from behavioral measures. How, then, can potential effects
of language structure on perception be tested? This requires an investigation
method that can tackle stages of mental processing that are sufficiently early,
unconscious, and automatic, so as to not be directly affected by online aspects
of language processing. There is thus no alternative but to test the hypothesis
using physiological correlates of perception that derive from brain activity.
A fully interactive, nonselective account of human brain physiology is
largely inconsistent with modular views positing a given faculty (such as
language) as encapsulated and relatively independent vis-à-vis other special-
ized brain systems such as perception, object categorization, or motor control
(Barsalou, 2008). As highlighted by Pulvermüller (1999) and in line with
the theoretical tenets of connectionism and Hebbian theory (Hebb, 1949), the
human brain is a richly connected network of neurons, in which functional sub-
networks recruit distributed cells firing in coincidence (cell assemblies) rather
than anatomically and/or functionally distinct modules. If one considers that
connectivity within the brain—involving forward connections and feedback
loops—spans the entire cortex and internal ganglia, it soon becomes evident
that making a distinction between language and the rest of the mind is essen-
tially meaningless. Making such a distinction implies that language and mind
are two ensembles that can be delimited, as if one could draw a line between
the two, or trace a line around language within the mind. This is mislead-
ing both from an anatomical and a neurophysiological viewpoint. First, it is
well established that high-level executive functions such as planning and at-
tention modulate perceptual processing at the most basic levels of processing
(McAdams & Reid, 2005). Second, to this day, there is little or no evidence for
language-specific regions in the human brain (Démonet, Thierry, & Cardebat,
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2005; Price, Thierry, & Griffiths, 2005). Indeed, areas of the cerebral cortex,
inner ganglia, and cerebellum involved in language processing are also acti-
vated by various nonverbal auditory and visual stimuli presented in a variety of
experimental contexts (e.g., Thierry, Giraud, & Price, 2003; Thierry & Price,
2006). Even though some recent studies have offered evidence in favor of what
may be construed as microselectivity in areas often associated with language
processing (Fedorenko, Duncan, & Kanwisher, 2012), the spatial and temporal
resolution of functional neuroimaging remains largely insufficient to estab-
lish any selectivity at the macrostructural level. Third, there is no shortage of
empirical evidence showing interaction between language and other perceptual-
cognitive processes, such as emotion (Wu & Thierry, 2012), decision making
(Costa, Foucart, Arnon, Aparici, & Apesteguia, 2014; Gao, Zika, Rogers, &
Thierry, 2015; Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012), or inhibitory control (Wu &
Thierry, 2013).
In sum, neurophysiology and cognitive neuroscience suggest that language
and thought are intrinsically bound together, and thus that language likely in-
fluences thought. An example of the mechanism through which this can occur
is the label-feedback hypothesis put forward by Lupyan (2012). Lupyan pro-
posed that a category name becomes associated with distinctive features of the
category it denotes as soon as it is learned. The activation of this name or label
then results in the modulation of lower-level perceptual processes via feedback
looping, filtering, and improving the bottom-up flow of information through the
perceptual system. Naming an object would thus lead to more categorical and
less idiosyncratic representations and effectively lead to the perceptual group-
ing of objects denoted by the same category label. This model, however, makes
the strong assumption that language representations (and the neural network un-
derpinning them) modulate low-level perceptual processing in real time rather
than by means of more durable structural and functional reorganizations. Fur-
thermore, the label-feedback hypothesis accounts for lexical effects, but says
little or nothing about the impact on perception of other structural properties of
language such as grammar and syntax. If the language–thought binding contin-
gency seems obvious and pervasive from a cognitive neuroscience perspective,
why spend time demonstrating its existence? I would argue that relativist re-
search has two main objectives: (a) characterizing the nature of the effects and
mechanisms through which language influences other aspects of cognition and
(b) establishing whether there exist conditions in which thought may actually
be independent of language.
As long as the phenomena studied empirically in linguistics, psycholin-
guistics, neurolinguistics, and cognitive science require, or merely encourage,
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conscious processing and verbalization, it will be impossible to establish an
effect of language on nonverbal thinking. Progress thus requires evidence that
minimizes the chances of a contamination by explicit top-down strategies,
which are likely to prompt language processing (overtly or implicitly) during
tasks that are supposedly nonverbal. In this sense, most behavioral studies pro-
vide insufficient evidence, because the effects reported can always be construed
as a mere effect of language on language (Pinker, 2007; Slobin, 1996). The need
for a neurophysiological approach becomes more and more clear: Observing
modulations of neural activity relating to perceptual or unconscious evaluation
of nonverbal stimuli that can be predicted on the basis of definitional, contrast-
ing properties of languages must be the best evidence that language shapes
human thought.
I am hopeful that this outlook challenges the idea that there are instances in
which language stands alone, disconnected from perception, attention, memory,
executive control, or thought, whatever definition one chooses to lend them.
Here, I discuss findings from three domains of research, which I believe strongly
undermine the idea that language may stand apart from the rest of our cognitive
make-up: (a) color and object categorization, (b) motion conceptualization, and
(c) executive function.
Color and Object Categorization
The firm determination to submit to experiment is not enough; there are
still dangerous hypotheses; first, and above all, those which are tacit and
unconscious. Since we make them without knowing it, we are powerless
to abandon them. (Henri Poincaré, 1913, p. 134)
Notwithstanding the disputable nature of conclusions from behavioral stud-
ies relying solely on overt decision data, a host of recent studies have convinc-
ingly demonstrated that lexical and grammatical information affects domain-
general cognitive processes. For example, color terminology has been shown to
influence categorical perception of color in monolingual and bilingual speakers
(Franklin et al., 2008; Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006). Athanasopoulos and
colleagues, in particular, have provided empirical evidence that native speakers
of Greek, who in their language have two basic color terms for light and dark
blue (ghalazio and ble), perceive these two shades of blue as more distinct
than do native speakers of English, whose language has only the basic color
term blue (Athanasopoulos, 2009; Athanasopoulos, Damjanovic, Krajciova, &
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Sasaki, 2011). Such effects have been found both in tasks inviting participants
to identify prototypical colors corresponding to a particular term and similarity
judgment tasks (Athanasopoulos et al., 2011).
To address the core question of possible online access to language rep-
resentations during overt behavioral tasks requiring conscious evaluation of
color features, we chose to record event-related brain potentials in partici-
pants, who were monitoring colored shapes in a very simple shape detection
task. Event-related potentials (ERPs) are derived from electroencephalographic
(EEG) activity recorded continuously throughout an experimental session from
the surface of the scalp of a participant, who is usually presented with a series of
visual or auditory stimuli. Real-time continuous EEG is essentially impossible
to interpret as is, at least when it comes to making inferences about the cognitive
processes involved. In order to purify the activity specific to a given stimulus
category or cognitive operation, the continuous EEG recording is split into
epochs, using stimulus onset time as a temporal reference. By averaging EEG
signals collected over several trials (generally at least 30), brain activity that is
unrelated to the particular stimulus presented or the particular cognitive opera-
tion performed by the participant is blurred and tends to fade into background
activity, whereas those variations of electrical potentials that specifically relate
to the stimuli presented tend to be repeated from one trial to the next and thus
to be revealed through averaging. ERPs offer a unique opportunity to study
the average modulation of activity produced by the brain in response to a class
of stimuli and/or a particular cognitive task. The temporal resolution of the
method is very high (in the order of the millisecond), but it provides little or no
information regarding the source of the signal in the brain.
We presented native speakers of Greek and English with streams of simple
shapes (mostly circles and, infrequently, squares) filled in light blue, dark blue,
light green, or dark green and instructed them to press a designated button when
they saw a square. Participants’ attention was thus drawn to shape rather than
color. Such an experimental procedure, the so-called oddball paradigm, has
been used extensively both in the auditory and the visual modalities to study
an automatic and unconscious response of the brain to stimulus perceptual
deviance (a detectable difference between frequent and rare stimuli)—mismatch
negativity (Czigler, 2014; Näätänen, Kujala, & Winkler, 2011). We predicted
that the existence of two basic color terms in Greek for light blue and dark blue
would result in a visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) of larger magnitude for
the blue contrast than the green contrast. The light green/dark green contrast
was used as a control condition, because Greek (like English) has only one basic
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color term for green (prasino). Therefore, we expected the contrast between
light green and dark green to elicit vMMNs of similar magnitude in the two
groups. And, indeed, we found the predicted three-way interaction between
participant group, color hue, and stimulus deviancy (Thierry, Athanasopoulos,
Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009). We concluded that a lexical distinction in
a given language leads to greater perceptual discrimination in individuals who
possess this distinction, as compared to speakers of a language that lacks the
distinction. We argued that this effect is not linked to online activation of verbal
representations in the mind of the participant (see below), but rather constitutes
evidence for a perceptual distinction established through repeated exposure to
color terms that constantly highlight color contrasts.
Some of our reviewers and a number of colleagues raised questions at the
time about this finding, most notably: (a) How do we know that the process is
unconscious? (b) Why could this not be explained by online lexical access, the
result being another example of online effects of language that do not imply the
long-term shaping of nonverbal representations by language? and (c) How do
we know that the effects found are not merely due to the different environments
in which the individuals of the two compared groups were raised? In other
words, how do we know that this is not merely a question of environmental
experience rather than a genuine effect of terminology and language use? Here
are tentative answers to these questions:
(a) We debriefed our participants very carefully at the end of each experiment,
and we were surprised to discover that most failed to recall that standard
stimuli (circles) could have different colors within any given block. Most
did recall (correctly) that squares could change color (i.e., be light blue or
dark blue within a block), but they failed to remember that the circles, too,
could change color within a block, even though this was the perceptual
change at the origin of the vMMN. The fact that participants could not
recall the critical manipulation at the origin of the vMMN modulation
suggests that they were not paying much attention to the critical stimuli
and that the processing of color deviancy was mostly automatic.
(b) Studies of online speech production using ERPs have shown that partic-
ipants in optimal conditions (after training) show the earliest effects of
lexical frequency at around 200 milliseconds after stimulus onset in pic-
ture naming (Costa, Strijkers, Martin, & Thierry, 2009; Strijkers, Costa,
& Thierry, 2010). In addition, when participants are not required to name
pictures, but rather make semantic decisions about them, lexical frequency
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effects are observed much later, presumably because lexical properties
of picture names are not critical to perform a semantic decision task
(Strijkers, Holcomb, & Costa, 2012). Taken together, these studies suggest
that specific lexical information is only available after 200 milliseconds
following the presentation of a picture, even when picture names have been
practiced and naming is directly required. The vMMN effect recorded in
Thierry et al. (2009) started before 200 milliseconds and occurred in cir-
cumstances when the critical stimuli required no naming, let alone full
perceptual evaluation, which suggests that it was not under online influ-
ence of language representations. Furthermore, when we investigated the
latency and amplitude of the P1 (an early peak of ERPs classically associ-
ated with early visual processing), we again found a striking dissociation
between groups: British participants showed a close overlap of amplitude
and latencies between P1s elicited by stimuli of matched lightness (light
blue and green on the one hand, and dark blue and green on the other),
but Greek participants showed a marked P1 dissociation between the four
stimuli as well as substantially increased variance. These differences are
very unlikely to be reducible to online effect of language processing.
(c) Greek participants were likely to have experienced different shades of blue
in their lives compared to locally sourced native speakers of English, given
the marked meteorological contrasts between Greece and Wales. However,
and even though this is not a definitive argument, the environment in
Wales and the United Kingdom generally boasts an extraordinary palette
of green shades, whereas the same can hardly be said of blue which is,
after all, rather infrequent in the United Kingdom. Therefore, if the larger
vMMN contrast found for blue than green in the native Greek participants
could be accounted for by the naturally occurring variety of blue shades in
the environment in Greece, one could reasonably predict a larger vMMN
contrast for green than blue in the British participant group. However, this
was not observed in our data.
Shortly after the publication of this first study, we realized that our Greek
group of 20 participants could be split into two groups of 10 with markedly
different lengths of stay in the United Kingdom. We thus set out to test whether
a longer stay in the United Kingdom, naturally correlated with increased pro-
ficiency in English, would lead to a reduction in the vMMN effect, because
the use of the word blue to refer to both ghalazio and ble might have led to a
dimming of the perceptual contrast between the two colors. We compared three
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groups: 10 native speakers of Greek who had spent an average of 7.2 months
(5–12) in the United Kingdom (short stay), 10 native speakers of Greek who
had spent an average of 42.6 months (18–60) in the United Kingdom (long
stay), and a group of 10 native speakers of English randomly selected from the
20 tested in the 2009 study. Recalculated vMMN results in the new participant
groupings revealed that dark and light blues were not only perceived as more
similar by long-stay Greek participants, but the vMMN effect elicited by the
blue contrast was also markedly reduced, as compared to that elicited in short-
stay bilinguals (Athanasopoulos, Dering, Wiggett, Kuipers, & Thierry, 2010).
These results strongly suggest that terminology not only drives categorical dis-
tinction at a perceptual level, but also that this process is eminently plastic in
nature, modulated by language exposure and usage.
Following these studies in the domain of color perception, we wondered if a
similar phenomenon could be observed in the domain of object categorization.
In collaboration with Bastien Boutonnet, we designed an experiment similar
to the color study contrasting pictures of cups and mugs, one picture being
the frequently presented standard and the other being the infrequent deviant
(Boutonnet, Dering, Viñas-Guasch, & Thierry, 2013). Infrequent pictures
depicting a bowl were the targets, which participants had to detect by pressing a
button. We tested 14 native speakers of English, who had no difficulty naming
the objects as cup and mug and 13 native speakers of Spanish in Spain, who
all called both objects taza. We predicted a two-way interaction between group
and deviancy, such that the vMMN difference between cups and mugs would
be greater in the English natives than the Spanish natives. Indeed, we found
essentially no vMMN amplitude difference between cups and mugs in the
Spanish group and a significant difference in native speakers of English. It must
be kept in mind that ERP markers of perceptual differences between objects dif-
ferentiated the two categories reliably in both groups of participants, that is, the
P1 peak of ERPs elicited by cups and mugs, averaged irrespective of frequency
status in the oddball experiment, elicited a P1 difference that was very similar
in the two groups, showing that the two objects were perceived as different, and
to a similar extent by speakers of each language. Indeed, it would be ludicrous
to think that because two objects are named using the same word, they could be
taken to be visually indistinguishable. However, during early stages of visual
categorization, these objects are less distinguishable among individuals who
use the same term to designate them than those who usually use distinct terms,
and in that sense, it remains fundamentally a question of perception.
Effects such as those reviewed above are eminently predictable for one
who is positively predisposed toward the premises of the linguistic relativity
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hypothesis: A difference in terminology relates to a difference in perceptual
processing. A stronger argument in favor of linguistic relativity, then, would be
to identify not merely concepts that can be distinguished on the basis of specific
lexical contrasts, but rather concepts that are related in a nontrivial fashion, for
instance, due to the existence of links that exist at a predominantly linguistic
level and have relatively low incidence at a conceptual level. The concepts of
horse and sea, for instance, can be considered only mildly related from a con-
ceptual viewpoint and probably not more so than bike and sea. Horse and sea,
however, are formally related in English through the existence of the compound
word seahorse. In the study by Boutonnet, McClain, and Thierry (2014), we
tested whether such relations between words idiosyncratic to a language would
yield predictable links between corresponding nonverbal representations and
concepts. We presented participants undergoing ERP recordings with picture
pairs that were either related in meaning, unrelated in meaning, or arbitrarily
related because of the existence of a compound word comprising the names
of the objects depicted by the two pictures. We quantified picture-to-picture
priming using the N400, a wave of ERP known to be modulated in amplitude
by semantic priming (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). As expected, we found that
related pictures elicited an N400 of reduced mean amplitude as compared to
unrelated pictures. Surprisingly, however, while pictures derived from words
forming a compound and presented in the same order (as in sea–horse) elicited
an N400 response similar to unrelated pictures, the N400 was significantly re-
duced when the pictures were presented in the reverse order (as in horse–sea).
We interpreted this result as evidence that the two concepts (e.g., horse and
sea), presented nonverbally and visually, are abnormally related in semantic
memory, because they primed one another to a greater extent than otherwise
unrelated concepts (e.g., horse and smoke), probably due to the existence of a
compound word crystallizing a formal link within the lexicon (e.g., seahorse).
It may be surprising that we did not find such priming effect when the pictures
were presented in the same order as words within the corresponding compound
(e.g., sea–horse). We interpreted these findings as a clash between conceptual
priming and access to the meaning of the actual compound (e.g., seahorse),
which was unrelated and thus conflicted with the concepts activated by the pic-
tures. This study broke new ground in neurolinguistic approaches to linguistic
relativity by revealing semantic associations between concepts driven mainly
by lexical relations idiosyncratic to a particular language and thus nontriv-
ially reliant on the signifiant–signifié relationship of Saussure (Saussure, Bally,
Sechehaye, & Riedlinger, 1916).
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Motion Conceptualization
Users of markedly different grammars [ . . . ] are not equivalent as
observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world.
(Benjamin Lee Whorf, 1956, p. 221)
One essential question, much closer to Whorf’s original speculations, is
whether effects of language on perception through a mind-shaping effect of
grammar could be more entrenched than those originating in terminology. Be-
yond linguistic observations suggesting that grammatical number and grammat-
ical gender may alter object categorization in observers of different languages
(Athanasopoulos & Kasai, 2008; Boutonnet, Athanasopoulos, & Thierry, 2012;
Cubelli, Paolieri, Lotto, & Job, 2011; Saalbach, Imai, & Schalk, 2012), a
paradigm that has attracted a lot of attention is that of motion perception, be-
cause of the rich diversity of the way in which different languages deal with,
for example, path, goal, direction, and manner of motion.
Some languages (e.g., English) tend to encode manner of motion within
the verb (compare to walk and to stroll, or to run and to sprint) whereas
others (e.g., French; Talmy, 1985) will more often optionally encode manner
through the addition of adverbs (compare marcher and marcher lentement,
or courrir and courrir très vite, which are tentative French translations of the
previously exemplified English verbs). Apart from the fact that individuals who
speak a manner-oriented language will (rather expectedly) be more inclined
to linguistically encode manner when describing motion events (Papafragou,
Hulbert, & Trueswell, 2008), the features of the language have been suggested
to mildly influence behavior in eye-tracking experiments (Flecken, Carroll,
Weimar, & von Stutterheim, 2015; Papafragou et al., 2008) and in a variety
of categorization, matching, and recognition tasks (Gennari, Sloman, Malt, &
Fitch, 2002; Kersten et al., 2010; Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002).
Another key example of the way in which grammatical idiosyncrasies of
different languages affect linguistic encoding strategies and, correlatively, con-
ceptualization of motion events, pertains to the domain of grammatical aspect.
Studies by von Stutterheim and Nüse (2013), von Stutterheim, Andermann,
Carroll, Flecken, and Schmiedtova (2012), and Flecken, von Stutterheim, and
Carroll (2014), for instance, have shown a relationship between grammatical
aspect and attention to endpoints when individuals observe motion. Indeed,
languages can be distinguished on the basis of their systematic or optional
encoding of aspect within verbs (Slobin, 2006). When asked to describe an in-
complete motion event (e.g., a video clip showing a woman walking on a road
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toward a car but not reaching the vehicle), speakers of nonaspect languages
(e.g., German or Swedish) tend to specify the action’s goal, or the endpoint, as
compared to speakers of aspect languages (e.g., English or French), who tend
to keep to the description of the motion itself and are thus less likely to mention
the endpoint (Bylund & Athanasopoulos, 2014; Bylund, Athanasopoulos, &
Oostendorp, 2013).
Perhaps the most radical demonstration of the impact of language aspect
on conceptualization is that recently offered by Athanasopoulos et al. (2015)
who showed how fluent German-English bilinguals can switch back and forth
between the goal-orientation preference of native speakers of either of their two
languages, depending on language context. Strikingly, when bilingual German-
English participants are asked to perform a verbal interference task (counting
backwards) in either English or German while categorizing video clips depict-
ing motion events, they display the goal-orientation preference of the language
not in use, as if that language was available to shape selection behavior!
While substantial behavioral evidence is now available to show that motion
event conceptualization depends on the properties of the native language and the
immediate language context, it remains the case that observing motion events
depicted by video clips or monitoring of eye movements using eye-tracking
during stimulus observation cannot exclude covert verbalization, and thus the
possibility of online influences of language, which again raises the spectre of
the effect of language on language criticism. Here, too, more compelling evi-
dence in support of the strong relativist viewpoint (Gentner & Goldin-Meadow,
2003; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Lucy, 1997) must come from cognitive neu-
rolinguistics, using experimental procedures that are less susceptible to covert
language involvement and that rely on direct neurophysiological measures of
cognitive processing more readily linked to conceptualization.
In a recent study by Flecken, Athanasopoulos, Kuipers, and Thierry (2015),
this was precisely what we aimed to do. We presented two groups of native
speakers of German or English with video animations of a black dot travelling
along a trajectory (straight or curved) toward a shape (square or hexagon). Given
that speakers of English, an aspect-language, are drawn to pay attention equally
to trajectory and endpoint, whereas speakers of German, a nonaspect language,
tend to pay more attention to endpoints, we expected the perceptual saliency of
the endpoint to be greater in native speakers of German than native speakers
of English. We engaged our participants in a motion event-picture matching
task in which animations were used as primes and were followed by picture
targets symbolizing the motion events. In 75% of trials, the animation prime
(e.g., dot moving along a straight line toward a square) was followed by a target
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picture featuring both a mismatched trajectory (e.g., a curve) and a mismatched
endpoint shape (e.g., a hexagon; mismatch condition); in 10% of trials, the
trajectory depicted in the picture target matched that of the dot in the animation
prime (trajectory match); in 10% of trials, the shape in the picture target matched
the endpoint shape of the animation prime (endpoint shape match); and in only
5% of trials, both the trajectory and the endpoint shape matched that of the
animation prime (full match). Participants were instructed to press a button
only in the full match condition. This design conformed to that of an oddball
paradigm geared toward probing conceptualization and conscious monitoring
because the relevant animation characteristics (trajectory and endpoint) were
directly relevant for task completion. We thus expected to see a P3b wave of
event-related brain potentials in the full-match condition, because this wave is
well known to index conscious detection of infrequent target stimuli among
frequent stimuli. Critically, the amplitude of the P3 elicited in partial match
conditions served as an index of the perceived importance of trajectory and
endpoint information, respectively. Endpoint-match stimuli elicited greater P3
amplitude than trajectory-match stimuli in native speakers of German tested
in Germany, but no differences between the P3s elicited by endpoint-match
and trajectory-match stimuli were found in native speakers of English tested in
the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a behavioral testing procedure conducted
in similar language groups failed to show any performance difference between
groups. This study is probably the first to show that grammatical properties
of the native language affect motion event conceptualization in a systematic
fashion, even when language involvement is unlikely, given the nature of the
stimuli and task, and when categorization behavior is not overtly biased by the
instructions.
Executive Function
But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.
(George Orwell, 1946, p. 167)
Beyond effects of language on perception and categorization, a critical ques-
tion is whether language can influence or even constrain aspects of executive
function and action selection. Language experience is known to affect cognitive
abilities. For example, bilinguals have been shown to outperform monolinguals
in a number of nonlinguistic tasks (e.g., the Simon task and the Attention Net-
work Test) that measure various aspects of executive function (Bialystok, Craik,
Klein, & Viswanathan, 2004; Costa, Hernández, & Sebastián-Gallés, 2008).
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One explanation for this apparent advantage is that managing two languages
requires constant selection of words in the intended language and inhibition
of words from the unintended language, processes that are thought to engen-
der a highly efficient control mechanism (Bialystok & Feng, 2009; Green &
Abutalebi, 2013). However, groups of bilinguals and monolinguals differ not
only in language ability but also in other respects, such as socioeconomic sta-
tus or ethnic origin and, indeed, these factors have been suggested to account
for the bilingual advantage (Costa, Hernández, Costa-Faidella, & Sebastián-
Gallés, 2009; Morton & Harper, 2007; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee,
2006). Unlike monolinguals, bilinguals can either use only a single language
(monolingual context) or both their languages (bilingual context) in any given
interaction. If bilingualism bestows a generic and sustained executive control
advantage to bilinguals, enhanced cognitive control should be observed inde-
pendently of language context. If, on the contrary, the advantage is context
dependent, enhancement should be greater in a bilingual than in a monolingual
context.
Wu and Thierry (2013) tested whether language context modulates exec-
utive functioning in Welsh-English bilinguals by measuring interference in an
adapted version of the flanker task (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner,
2002). Participants were instructed to report the direction of a central arrow
(i.e., the target) surrounded by congruent or incongruent flanker arrows. Occa-
sionally, instead of arrows, participants were presented with a word, which they
were instructed to ignore. The experiment contained three blocks in which the
contextual words to be ignored were in Welsh, in English, or in either of the
two languages. Whereas the cognitive interference caused by incongruent trials
was of similar magnitude when intervening words were all in one language
or the other within a block, the amount of interference decreased (and thus
participants were better able to manage incongruent trials) when contextual
words were randomly presented in English and Welsh. This study was the first
to demonstrate a direct influence of language context on executive function
within the same bilingual individuals, which means that inhibitory control can
be modulated by simply presenting participants with a mix of words from
their two languages, even when word stimuli are irrelevant and participants are
instructed to ignore them.
In the domain of decision making, language has been found to influence
cognitive and emotional processes that mediate departures from normatively
rational choice (Keysar et al., 2012). This is due in part to the fact that language
can modify one’s emotional state, which in turn can affect various aspects of
decision making (Damasio, 1996; De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan,
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2006). Damasio (1996) provided compelling clinical evidence that emotion is
an integral component of decision making that can lead to suboptimal decisions
or even indecision. On the other hand, mental representations are known to be
sensitive to established language-emotion interactions. Wu and Thierry (2012),
for instance, reported inhibition of access to native lexical representations
by emotionally negative words presented in the second language of Chinese-
English bilinguals: When presented with pairs of English words that concealed
a Chinese character repetition in their Chinese translation, a well-established
effect of unconscious access to native translation equivalent representation
(Thierry & Wu, 2007; Wu & Thierry, 2010) was not found if the prime word
had a negative affective valence, but the anticipated priming was found when
primes were affectively positive or neutral. This suggests that emotional aspects
of people’s decision making, sometimes associated with suboptimal choices,
may be susceptible to the language context in which they operate.
Keysar and colleagues (2012), who investigated language-cognition inter-
actions in decision making under risk, showed how using a foreign language
modulates framing and loss aversion when participants choose between risky
and safe prospects. In their native language, participants displayed standard risk
aversion for dilemmas emphasizing gains, on the one hand, and risk-seeking
behavior for dilemmas emphasizing losses, on the other, but they did not do so
in their second language. This and other findings (e.g., Costa et al., 2014) show
that making decisions in a second language moderates peoples’ risk-attitudes
by underweighting larger gains and losses, which is consistent with the framing
effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), and equalizes the impact of good and bad
choice outcomes, thus modulating loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Note that, in real settings, decisions are often sequenced together such that
good or bad outcomes of given trials influence subsequent choices (Osborn
& Jackson, 1988; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) and this can happen even when
decision outcome is unpredictable or random as, for example, in the case of the
Hot Hand Fallacy, in which random events with a positive outcome are wrongly
interpreted as reflecting a winning streak (Ayton & Fischer, 2004).
Gao et al. (2015) tested whether risk taking would be modulated by
language-based feedback when participants repeatedly chose between playing
and leaving (not playing) 50/50 gambles to win small monetary rewards. The
choices were presented in numeric form, but the outcome was presented using
adjectives with positive and negative valence in the participants’ first language
(Chinese) or second language (English). We modeled the effects of present-
ing feedback, indicating good and bad outcome in either Chinese or English,
upon participants’ subsequent decisions to play. In addition, we used ERPs to
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investigate a possible link between the neural correlates of language processing
and the processing of decision outcomes themselves based on modulation of the
feedback-related negativity (FRN). The FRN is a frontally distributed negative
deflection of ERPs, which typically peaks between 250 and 300 milliseconds
after the onset of feedback stimulus and is sensitive to feedback valence, that
is, how good or bad outcomes turn out to be (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). Because emotional
sensitivity has been shown to differ in the first and second language of bilinguals
(Harris, Aycicegi, & Gleason, 2003), we hypothesized that feedback words in
English would elicit an FRN smaller in amplitude than their Chinese equiv-
alents, in turn affecting risk-taking behavior. While positive feedback incited
participants to play more on the next trial than negative feedback, we found
a striking dissociation between languages, such that positive feedback in the
native language (Chinese) incited participants to take 10% more gambles (i.e.,
more risk) on the next trial, as compared to all other conditions. This striking
effect of language context was further supported by correlations between dif-
ferences in FRN amplitude between language of feedback and differences in
probabilities of playing. In other words, expressions that appear to convey the
same message appear to have a profoundly different effect on decision making,
depending on whether they are presented in the native or the second language
of bilinguals, showing that interactions between language and decision making
should not be taken lightly.
Conclusion
There is now substantial neurophysiological evidence validating psycholinguis-
tic data and theoretical linguistic accounts of linguistic relativity: Language(s),
human perception, and aspects of cognition that may be construed as nonverbal
interact in a rich and complex fashion. At the forefront of the current inquiry in
this field is the question of the causal role of language and the depth of its per-
vasive influence on thinking. The studies reviewed above show that lexical and
grammatical distinctions between languages affect elementary aspects of color
and object perception, or motion conceptualization, and support the positive
interpretation of results from behavioral experiments that have tested premises
of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Notwithstanding the debate among lin-
guists regarding the existence of language universals (Evans & Levinson, 2009;
von Fintel & Matthewson, 2008), a neurolinguistic approach can offer answers
without requiring systematic comparison of all the many languages of the
world. In addition to providing insights from within a particular language, the
neurolinguistic approach allows us to characterize the nature of the relationship
Language Learning 66:3, September 2016, pp. 690–713 706
Thierry Neurolinguistic Relativity
between formal aspects of language, perception, and concepts on the basis of
unbiased physiological measurements rather than human performance in be-
havioral tasks prone to inciting metacognitive evaluation and thus susceptible
to interpretative muddling.
Many questions remain unanswered. In fact, accepting the linguistic rela-
tivity hypothesis raises many new and fascinating questions: Is language and its
particular forms not only sufficient, but also essential to the existence of certain
perceptual distinctions? How reliable are such distinctions without language
encoding? Are different types of learning—implicit or explicit—differently
affected by language? How does language interact with other extralinguistic
variables in shaping human cognition? How are the effects of differing lin-
guistic codes reconciled in the multilingual mind? Does language proficiency
directly or indirectly impact conceptual organization? How do languages and
sociocultural conceptions interact in shaping human civilization? One can only
hope that future research will progressively unveil such mechanisms and es-
tablish how strategic language use can better assist human learning, cognitive
development, and decision making.
Final revised version accepted 6 March 2016
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von Stutterheim, C., & Nüse, R. (2003). Processes of conceptualization in language
production: Language-specific perspectives and event construal. Linguistics, 41,
831–881.
Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wu, Y. J., & Thierry, G. (2010). Chinese-English bilinguals reading English hear
Chinese. Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 7646–7651.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1602-10.2010
Wu, Y. J., & Thierry, G. (2012). How reading in a second language protects your heart.
Journal of Neuroscience, 32, 6485–6489. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6119-11.2012
Wu, Y. J., & Thierry, G. (2013). Fast modulation of executive function by language
context in bilinguals. Journal of Neuroscience, 33, 13533–13537.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4760-12.2013
713 Language Learning 66:3, September 2016, pp. 690–713
